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COMMENT
FRUSTRATED SETTLEMENTS: COMMON PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS IN LIABILITY SETTLEMENTS
INVOKING THE MEDICARE SECONDARY
PAYER STATUTES
Jeffrey R. Kuchel*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a third party is responsible for injuring a Medicare-eligible indi-
vidual and Medicare pays for the resulting medical treatment, the payment
is considered conditional and repayment to Medicare is required.  Medicare
will typically be billed first and pay for the beneficiary’s care, but when
another party is responsible, Medicare has the right to recoup these “condi-
tional payments” from the responsible party pursuant to the Medicare Sec-
ondary Payer Act (“MSP”).1  While Congress intended to reduce costs to
protect the Medicare Trust Fund, the MSP is widely recognized as an ad-
ministrative nightmare by both sides of the bar as it complicates and im-
pedes settlements.2  Additionally, under the MSP’s authority, the govern-
ment’s ability to mete out stiff penalties against insurers, Medicare benefi-
ciaries, attorneys, and others demands consideration when litigating or
settling liability cases.3
* Jeffrey R. Kuchel, candidate for J.D. 2013, The University of Montana School of Law.  The
author specially thanks Joan and Craig Kuchel for their unwavering support.  Special thanks to Kathleen
DeSoto, Matt Hayhurst, and Jonathan McDonald for their advice and input throughout the development
of this comment.  Additional thanks to the staff and editors of the Montana Law Review for their gui-
dance and hard work.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2006).
2. David Ingram, Odd Allies in Medicare Fight, Natl. L. J. 1, 4 (Aug. 15, 2011).
3. See infra part III.  In order to accomplish recoupment of conditional payments, CMS has a
direct right of recovery, automatic right of subrogation, and a private right of action.  If it must resort to
1
Kuchel: Frustrated Settlements: Common Problems and Solutions in Liability Settlements Invoking the Medicare Secondary Payer Statutes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-2\MON202.txt unknown Seq: 2 24-OCT-12 9:47
396 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 73
Imagine Fred, a Medicare beneficiary, suffers a broken hip because of
a fall at Big Box Store.  Fred is hospitalized and Medicare pays $50,000 for
Fred’s health care.  Fred later sues Big Box Store who denies responsibility
but wants to settle.  Fred is willing to accept a discounted settlement of
$65,000, but Big Box Store wants to ensure any Medicare liens are satisfied
first. But if Big Box Store issues the $65,000 to Fred, Medicare considers
itself a secondary payer to Big Box Store and the $50,000 is then consid-
ered a “conditional payment.”  Now, if Fred does not reimburse Medicare
for the conditional payment, Medicare can seek repayment from Big Box
Store, despite its settlement with Fred.  Additionally, if Medicare must sue
to recoup the conditional payment, it is statutorily entitled to double dam-
ages.  Even further, anyone receiving payment from a “primary payer,” as
Big Box Store is in this example, is potentially liable to repay Medicare for
the conditional payments in addition to being exposed to potential penalties.
This comment discusses current concerns and potential solutions for
situations involving the MSP.  While both workers’ compensation and lia-
bility claims come within the ambit of the MSP, this comment primarily
examines issues surrounding liability settlements.
II. BACKGROUND OF MEDICARE AND THE MEDICARE
SECONDARY PAYER STATUTES
Medicare provides health insurance to eligible elderly and disabled
beneficiaries.4  Medicare currently covers over forty-nine million Ameri-
cans.5  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), an
agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), is
responsible for administering the Medicare program.6  In its infancy, Medi-
care was the primary payer for its beneficiaries’ health care expenses in all
circumstances except in cases where health care expenses were incurred as
a result of work-related injuries.7  In response to the rapidly increasing costs
of Medicare, in 1980, Congress enacted the Medicare Secondary Payer
Act.8  The MSP requires Medicare to be a “secondary payer” behind other
entities—so called “primary payers”—responsible for a beneficiary’s health
litigation to recover conditional payments, CMS is statutorily allowed double damages plus interest.
Additionally, the MSP requires primary payers to report settlements and judgments, and a failure to do
so properly results in a $1,000 per day, per claim penalty.
4. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 402–431.
5. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Fact Sheet: Medicare at a Glance 1, http://www.kff.
org/medicare/upload/1066-14.pdf (Nov. 21, 2011).
6. Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Servs., Medicare General Information, Eligibility and Enti-
tlement Manual, CMS Publ’n 100-01, ch. 1, § 20 (rev. 1, 2002), http://www.cms.gov/manuals/down
loads/ge101c01.pdf.
7. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426a).
8. See Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995); H.R. Rpt. 96-116 at 389 (1980).
2
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care.9  Thus, the MSP bars Medicare payments when a primary payer either
makes a payment or can be reasonably expected to do so promptly.10  But
when a primary payer does not pay or is reasonably expected not to pay
promptly, Medicare may conditionally pay for the beneficiary’s services
and recover its expenses if a primary payer makes a payment—hence the
term “conditional payment.”11
Congress set forth various amendments to clarify and strengthen the
MSP in an effort to compensate for the original, 1980 legislation, which
lacked the requisite enforcement options to ensure that Medicare was truly a
secondary payer.12  In 1984, Congress amended the MSP, specifically giv-
ing CMS a right of subrogation as well as a direct right of action to recover
proceeds for conditional payments.13
In 2003, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act (“MMA”).14  This Act enabled Medicare to
make conditional payments when the primary payer had not paid or pay-
ment was not reasonably expected to be made promptly.15  The MMA pro-
vided for retroactive effectiveness of its amendments to the date of the orig-
inal 1980 legislation,16 expanded the entities included in the definition of a
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b).  To avoid confusion, the term “primary payer” is used throughout
this comment.  However, the MSP and attending regulations use several terms, including “primary
plan,” “responsible reporting entity,” and “applicable plan.”  Each of these terms refers to the same
entity, but in slightly different contexts.  Thus, the definition for “primary plan” includes the definition
of “primary payer.”  The MSP defines “primary plan,” as private health insurance, a workers’ compen-
sation law, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan), or no-fault
insurance.  42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 411.21; see also Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845 (“The
transformation of Medicare from the primary payer to the secondary payer with a right of reimburse-
ment reflects the overarching statutory purpose of reducing Medicare costs.”).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A).  “Promptly” is defined as 120 days from the date of service.  42
C.F.R. §§ 411.21, 411.50.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i)–(iv); 42 C.F.R § 411.52 (granting Medicare authority to make
conditional payments; U.S. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 875 (11th Cir. 2003) (“if payment for
covered services has been or is reasonably expected to be made by someone else, Medicare does not
have to pay. In order to accommodate its beneficiaries, however, Medicare does make conditional pay-
ment for covered services, even when another source may be obligated to pay, if that other source is not
expected to pay promptly” (citing Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775, 777 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
12. Jennifer C. Jordan, The Complete Guide to Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance, ch. 1, § 4
(LexisNexis, Matthew Bender).
13. Denekas v. Shalala, 943 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (citing U.S. v. Geier, 816
F.Supp. 1332, 1336 (W.D. Wis. 1993)).  Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 411.26(a), Medicare has an unfettered
right to subrogate, and if it chooses to subrogate, its lien is superior to that of any other creditor entitled
to payment by the primary payer. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
14. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 103(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2155–2158 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1395y.
15. Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 1, § 1.01(5).
16. Id.  Courts have subsequently supported the retroactive application of the MMA, characterizing
the amendments as clarifications of the original law rather than a substantial change in the law. Id.
3
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primary plan, and provided the government with the ability to seek double
damages if litigation was necessary to recover conditional payments.17
In 2007, Congress amended the MSP again with the Medicare, Medi-
caid, and SCHIP Extension Act (“MMSEA”),18 which, by imposing spe-
cific reporting obligations on primary payers, CMS would be better posi-
tioned to enforce its existing rights under the MSP.19  Section 111 of the
MMSEA contains the reporting requirement, which is why it is colloquially
known as “Section 111 reporting.”  Regardless of any liability determina-
tion, § 111 requires primary payers to submit a specific report once a claim
“is resolved through a settlement judgment, award, or other payment.”20
Following these major amendments, the MSP, which was once diffi-
cult to enforce, now had the requisite “teeth” to effect compliance.21  Practi-
tioners must be aware of these “teeth” in order to protect their client’s inter-
ests and themselves.
III. THE SO-CALLED TEETH
The enforcement enhancements provide a means to protect the Medi-
care Trust Fund.  The amendments discussed above added rights enabling
the government to recover conditional payments from various entities in
addition to the ability to levy civil, monetary penalties.  If a primary payer
fails to properly complete the requisite Section 111 reporting following a
settlement or payment made to a Medicare beneficiary, the MSP imposes a
penalty of $1,000 per claim, per day of noncompliance against the primary
payer.22
CMS has an automatic right of subrogation to recover conditional pay-
ments23 and a direct right of action to obtain reimbursement from the pri-
17. Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 1-1, § 5.
18. Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-173, 121 Stat. 2492
(2007) (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(7–8)).
19. Jennifer Jordan, Medicare Secondary Payer Enforcement: Shifting the Burden of Medicare to
the Private Sector, 39 The Brief 13, 14 (Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section of the ABA, Fall 2009).
Under the MMSEA, primary payers are referred to as “applicable plans” and “responsible reporting
entities” and include liability insurance (including self-insurance), no fault insurance, and workers’ com-
pensation laws or plans.  42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(F).  The MSP, attendant regulations, and the Medi-
care Secondary Payer Manual published by CMS use varying terminology in different situations.
20. 42 U.S.C § 1395y(b)(8)(C).
21. See e.g. Kristopher R. Alderman, The Sixth Circuit Gives Teeth to the Medicare Secondary
Payer Act Private Cause of Action, 8 ABA Health eSource (newsltr. of the ABA Sec. Health L.) (Nov.
2011) (available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_
health_law_esource_1111_alderman.html); Tamara Smith Holtslag & Jennifer L. Rousseau, Business
Law & Business Litigation: New Medicare Secondary Payer Act Has Teeth: How to Protect Your Cli-
ents, 22 Bar News (newsltr. of the N.H. Bar Ass’n) 15 (Dec. 16, 2011) (available at http://www.nhbar.
org/publications/display-news-issue.asp?id=6240).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(E)(i).
23. Id. at § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iv); 42 C.F.R. at § 411.26.
4
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mary payer and from the entity that receives payment from the primary plan
when the claim is paid.24  The MSP also provides for a private cause of
action, allowing a beneficiary to bring suit for double damages against a
primary payer who fails either to reimburse CMS or to make a primary
payment.25  If CMS exercises its rights of recovery by way of litigation to
recover conditional payments, it is statutorily entitled to double damages
plus interest.26  If no legal action is required, CMS may recover the lesser
of the conditional payment or the full payment that the primary payer is
obligated to pay.27  Further, if a primary payer pays an injured party, its
duty to repay CMS is not extinguished; for if CMS is not reimbursed for the
conditional payments as required, the primary payer must reimburse CMS
even though it has already paid the beneficiary or other party.28  For exam-
ple, recall Fred from the earlier example and imagine that he deposits and
then spends his entire settlement recovery.  When CMS seeks repayment,
Fred no longer has the money, but CMS may nonetheless bring suit and is
entitled to recover from Big Box Store because it is considered a primary
payer.  This also applies if a primary payer makes a payment to an entity
other than Medicare “when it is, or should be, aware that Medicare has
made a conditional primary payment.”29  Because CMS is able to recover
with such force, the processes prescribed by CMS should be closely fol-
lowed to ensure compliance.
IV. THE MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER CLAIMS PROCESS
CMS contracts with the MSP Recovery Contractor to handle all the
functions related to MSP recoveries.30  CMS may be alerted to the existence
of an MSP claim prior to any final settlement or judgment.31  When this
24. 42 U.S.C. at § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii); 42 C.F.R. at § 411.24(b), (e).
25. 42 C.F.R. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).  A primary payment is merely a payment made by a primary
payer.  In situations where the MSP applies, Medicare is the secondary payer and the primary plan is the
primary payer.  Further, the private cause of action is not a qui tam action. Stalley v. Catholic Health
Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 527 (8th Cir. 2007); Tamela J. White, The Medicare Secondary Payer Act and
Section 111 of the Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP Extension Act of 2007: Implications for Claim Manage-
ment and Resolution for Liability Insurance Plans, 77 Def. Couns. J. 180, 186 (Apr. 2010).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii); 42 C.F.R. at § 411.24(c)(2), (h), (m).
27. 42 C.F.R. at § 411.24(c)(1).
28. 42 U.S.C. at § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii); 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c)(2), (i)(1), (m)(1)–(2).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i)(2); see also Haskell v. Graham, 2010 WL 2350589 (N.D. Ill. June 10,
2010).
30. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Secondary Payer General Information,
Overview, https://www.cms.gov/MSPRGenInfo/ (accessed July 22, 2012).
31. See Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Servs., Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) Manual,
CMS Publ’n 100-05, ch. 6, §§ 10–10.1 (available at https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IOMs-Items/CMS019017.html) [hereinafter MSP Manual].
For instance, CMS may be alerted to situations when Medicare should be a secondary payer when
notification is received from attorneys or Medicare beneficiaries, through Section 111 reporting, or
5
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occurs, the MSP Recovery Contractor issues a Rights and Responsibilities
letter to the beneficiary and his or her attorney, which notifies the recipients
that CMS is aware that a primary payer exists and requests further informa-
tion about any settlements or payments.32  The MSP Recovery Contractor
simultaneously searches the beneficiary’s health care claims to find any
claims related to the accident or injury at issue.33  Following this initial
sweep, the MSP Recovery Contractor issues a Conditional Payment Letter
identifying claims believed to have been paid conditionally and thus, the
responsibility of the primary payer.34  Importantly, the Conditional Payment
Letter indicates only an interim amount.35
When CMS is not notified of a claim until after a settlement or judg-
ment, the MSP Recovery Contractor will conduct a search of health care
claims and then issue a Conditional Payment Notice identifying health care
claims believed to be the responsibility of the primary payer.36  Parties in
receipt of the Conditional Payment Notice have 30 days to provide specific
information about the settlement, payment, or judgment, including the
amount spent on attorneys’ fees and costs and any documentation support-
ing challenges to specific charges included in the Conditional Payment No-
tice.37  If the information is received within 30 days, the MSP Recovery
Contractor considers any challenges to the initial charges listed and issues a
final demand letter, reducing the total amount due proportionally for pro-
curement costs.38  If a timely response is not received, however, the final
demand letter will issue requesting repayment of all conditional payments
without a proportionate reduction for procurement costs.39
through the Medicare claims process. Id. at § 10.0.  The entity that initially receives the information is
the Coordination of Benefits Contractor (“COBC”) who, upon identifying an MSP situation, transfers
the entire record to the MSP Recovery Contractor. See id.
32. MSPRC, Rights and Responsibilities Letter Template, (available at http://www.msprc.info/
forms/RightsAndResponsibilitiesLetter.pdf).
33. Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 3, § 3.06.
34. Id.; MSPRC, Conditional Payment Letter, (available at http://www.msprc.info/includes/letters/
docs/ML040NGHP.pdf).
35. MSPRC, Tool Kits, Liability Insurance, No-Fault Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation Re-
covery, Reporting a Case, http://www.msprc.info/forms/reporting%20a%20case.pdf (accessed July 30,
2012).  This alone has the ability to frustrate settlement discussions, as the MSP Recovery Contractor’s
Conditional Payment Letters merely indicate an interim amount and not a final amount due if the case
were to settle.
36. MSPRC, New Conditional Payment Notice Process, http://www.msprc.info/forms/cpn.pdf (ac-
cessed July 30, 2012).
37. Id.
38. Id.; See 42 C.F.R. § 411.37.
39. MSPRC, New Conditional Payment Notice Process, http://www.msprc.info/forms/cpn.pdf (ac-
cessed July 30, 2012).  Despite the MSP Recovery Contractor’s statement otherwise in these situations,
courts may require repayment amounts to be reduced by the procurement fees as described in 42 C.F.R.
§ 411.37. See e.g. Est. of Washington v. U.S., Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 53 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th
6
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Following a final sweep of claims, the MSP Recovery Contractor is-
sues the final demand letter, which must be repaid within 60 days.40  If
payment is not received within 60 days, interest begins to accrue from the
date the demand letter was issued.41  While Medicare has the option of re-
ducing or waiving its recovery of conditional payments in certain situa-
tions,42 procurement costs are the only guaranteed deduction from a settle-
ment amount.43
V. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
SETTLING LIABILITY CLAIMS
Congress’s amendments to the MSP provided the government several
robust means to ensure recovery of conditional payments. These so-called
“teeth,” and the fact that the government may recover conditional payments
from anyone who received a payment from a primary plan,44 requires prac-
titioners to take extra caution in liability settlement situations involving a
Medicare beneficiary.  Although the MSP claims process appears straight-
forward,45 a number of obstacles arise when attempting to settle a claim
invoking the MSP.  All parties involved are potentially exposed to the
MSP’s “teeth,” but a significant obstacle faced by primary payers is the
possibility that it could be required to pay twice if repayment is not made
from the original settlement funds.46  The liability exposure faced by clients
and attorneys warrants an understanding of the law and the diligence to
settle a case involving the MSP.
A. Confirming Medicare Eligibility Status
The MSP only applies to claims involving Medicare beneficiaries.  It
follows, then, that the Medicare eligibility status of a plaintiff must be con-
firmed when approaching settlement discussions.  Primary payers must as-
certain whether a plaintiff is, in fact, a Medicare beneficiary to determine
Cir. 1985) (court reduced recovery amount, finding that Medicare must abide by the Code of Federal
Regulations and must adjust its recovery by procurement costs).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii); 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(h).  Notably, “[i]f Medicare is not reim-
bursed [within 60 days], the primary payer must reimburse Medicare even though it has already reim-
bursed the beneficiary or other party.”  42 C.F.R. § 411.24(i)(1).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
42. 42 C.F.R. § 411.28(a) (“CMS may waive recovery, in whole or in part, if the probability of
recovery, or the amount involved, does not warrant pursuit of the claim.”); MSP Manual, supra n. 31, at
ch. 7, §§ 50.6–50.6.5.1.
43. Procurement costs include attorney’s fees and costs necessary to procure the settlement or judg-
ment.  42 C.F.R. § 411.37.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); see 42 C.F.R § 411.24(g).
45. See supra part IV (discussing the MSP claims process).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(h), (i)(1).
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whether Section 111 reporting is required.47  Naturally, the simplest way for
a primary payer to be alerted to a plaintiff’s Medicare beneficiary status is
by voluntary disclosure.  But when the information is not known or dis-
closed, primary payers responsible for Section 111 reporting have access to
a verification system that allows them to search for the plaintiff’s Medicare
beneficiary status by using the plaintiff’s Social Security number or Medi-
care Health Insurance Claim number.48  Unfortunately, this can be problem-
atic as the primary payer may not possess this information, and nothing in
the code requires an injured party to provide it.49  Nonetheless, courts agree
that this information is available through discovery requests.50  One court
even found it reasonable for an insurer to condition disbursement of settle-
ment funds on a sixteen-year-old plaintiff’s provision of her Social Security
number in order to limit the insurer’s liability under the MSP.51  Thus,
counsel representing a primary payer would be wise to request this informa-
tion during the early stages of discovery in order to determine if the MSP
applies.
B. Providing for Future Medical Expenses: Medicare Set-Asides
An often discussed and troublesome area of the MSP is the use of
Medicare set-asides in liability cases.  A Medicare set-aside is essentially a
trust fund, created by settling parties, to be used to pay for continued medi-
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(A)(i) (providing that an applicable plan shall “determine whether a
claimant (including an individual whose claim in unresolved) is entitled to benefits under the program
under this subchapter on any basis”).
48. See generally Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Section 111 GHP User Guide, Ver-
sion 3.0, 111–113. Available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits/MandatoryIns
Rep/downloads/GHPUserGuideV3.pdf.
49. Jordan, supra n. 19, at 15.  For injured Medicare beneficiaries, there is a legal duty to cooperate
with Medicare’s recovery efforts; otherwise, the beneficiary will face personal repayment responsibility.
42 C.F.R. § 411.23.  However, for those that may not be Medicare beneficiaries, there is no similar duty
imposed by statute or regulation.  For instance, under I.R.C. § 104, compensation for personal injury is
not taxable, thus removing one possible legal duty of an injured party to provide her Social Security
Number (“SSN”) or Health Insurance Care Number (“HICN”) to the primary payer.
50. Seger v. Tank Connection, LLC, 2010 WL 1665253 at ** 4–5 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2010) (reason-
ing that one purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(C) was to avoid having insurers “at the mercy” of
plaintiffs when ascertaining Medicare eligibility, and finding that interrogatory requesting the plaintiff’s
SSN or HICN was reasonable in order to comply with the MSP reporting requirements); Smith v. Sound
Breeze of Groton Condominium Ass’n., 2011 WL 803067 at * 3 (Conn. Super. Feb. 3, 2011) (same).
51. Hackley v. Garofano, 2010 WL 3025597 at * 4 (Conn. Super. Jul. 1, 2010) (finding that the
insurer could condition disbursement of a sixteen-year-old’s settlement proceeds upon provision of her
SSN in order to comply with Section 111 verification and reporting).  The Court also noted that because
the SSN or HICN “is essential to the administration of the Medicare program . . . . [c]ollection of SSNs
for the purpose of coordinating benefits with Medicare is a required, legitimate and necessary use of the
SSN under federal law and is thus permitted by HIPAA” Id. at *3 n. 2.
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cal care relating to the original incident.52  By establishing a set-aside for
this purpose, the settling parties protect Medicare’s future interests.53
While the legal obligations of a tortfeasor or insurer terminate upon settle-
ment, under the MSP, the obligations of a primary payer with regard to
future medical treatment do not.54  Set-asides are commonplace in workers’
compensation settlements, and they have developed with substantial gui-
dance from CMS.55  In fact, CMS has provided guidelines for situations
requiring a set-aside in workers’ compensation cases.56  Unfortunately, the
MSP and regulations are bereft of clear guidance for liability claims.  Nev-
ertheless, set-asides in liability claims should be utilized when the plaintiff
will require future medical care.
Although set-aside requirements are not codified, if a plaintiff requires
post-settlement medical services because of the original injury, the MSP
instructs that Medicare should be the secondary payer.  Indeed, all pay-
ments made by Medicare are considered conditional—that is to say that
Medicare is the secondary payer—when “payment has been made or rea-
sonably can be expected to be made” by a primary payer.57  Thus, a settle-
ment between parties does not cause Medicare to relinquish its right of re-
covery, because if Medicare pays for a beneficiary’s post-settlement medi-
cal services that relate to the original injury giving rise to the settlement,
then the statute applies as though “payment has been made.”58  In spite of
the lack of express statutory language requiring Medicare set-asides in lia-
bility cases, CMS takes the position that they are required.
One of the myriad memorandums distributed by CMS—dubbed the
“Patel Memo”59—outlined CMS’s position that Medicare’s interests need
to be protected when determining future medical costs.  Although the Patel
Memo discussed set-asides only in the workers’ compensation context, it
stated the basic premise—that the set-aside requirement was designed to
52. See Jordan, supra n. 19, at 19. CMS defines a Medicare set-aside as “an administrative mecha-
nism used to allocate a portion of a settlement, judgment or award for future medical and/or future
prescription drug expenses. For practical purposes, Medicare set-asides are typically referred to as
‘MSAs.’  A set-aside arrangement may be in the form of a Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set-Aside
Arrangement (WCMSA), No-Fault Liability Medicare Set-Aside Arrangement (NFSA), or Liability
Medicare Set-Aside Arrangement (LMSA).” MSP Manual, supra n. 30, at ch. 1, § 20.  To avoid confu-
sion, the term “Medicare set-aside” is often substituted for “medical set-aside.” Id.
53. See Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 4, § 4.01.
54. Jordan, supra n. 19, at 19.
55. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.46, 411.47.
56. MSP Manual, supra n. 31, at ch. 1, § 10.4.1; see Memo. from Parashar B. Patel, Deputy Dir.,
Purchasing Policy Group, Ctr. for Medicare Management, to All Associated Regulations Administrators,
Workers’ Compensation: Commutation of Future Benefits (July 23, 2001) (available at https://www.
cms.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/Downloads/72301Memo.pdf) [hereinafter Patel Memo.].
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).
58. See id.
59. See generally Patel Memo., supra n. 56.
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prevent Medicare from paying for future medical care covered by a primary
payer.60
Specifically discussing set-asides in the liability context, the moderator
of a 2010 teleconference conducted by CMS stated, without further expla-
nation, that while the workers’ compensation set-aside process was “for-
malized,” the process for liability set-asides was informal.61  The informal
process referenced was apparently a party’s ability to contact the appropri-
ate CMS regional office, which could choose to review a proposed set-aside
amount “if they believe there is [sic] significant dollars at issue.”62  The
moderator further noted that even in the absence of a formalized process,
the underlying statutory obligation remains the same.63
As is common with the MSP, change appears to be on the horizon.  On
June 15, 2012, CMS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
solicit comment on Medicare set-asides in liability situations.64  The pro-
posed rule would expressly require the party receiving a settlement to “sat-
isfy Medicare’s interest with respect to ‘future medicals’” related to the
settlement in one of several proposed ways, including a set-aside.65
Until such a rule is codified, though, there appears to be no infallible
way to consider Medicare’s interest with respect to future medical ex-
penses.  One commentator describes the issue of whether a Medicare set-
aside should be completed as “[o]ne of the most important questions in
MSP compliance,” which warrants four general questions.  If any are an-
swered affirmatively, the MSP may be implicated along with a set-aside:
1. Does the settlement involve compensation for a medical claim from which
defendant will be released from responsibility?
60. See id. at 1–3.
61. Barbara Wright, Moderator, Town Hall Teleconference, Section 111 of the Medicare, Medicaid
& SCHIP Extension Act of 2007: 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(8) at 41 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices, Mar. 16, 2010) (copy of transcript available at http://www4a.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Down
loads/March16NGHPTranscript.pdf).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 77 Fed. Reg. 35917–35918 (June 15, 2012).
65. Id. at 35917, 35919–35920 (proposed June 15, 2012).  Additionally, CMS recently distributed a
memorandum announcing that when a beneficiary’s treating physician certifies in writing that the treat-
ment for the alleged injury has been completed as of the date of the settlement, Medicare considers its
interest satisfied with respect to future medical expenses for that particular settlement.  Memo. from
Charlotte Benson, Acting Dir., Financial Services Group, Office of Financial Management, to Consor-
tium Administrator for Financial Management and Fee-for-Service Operations, Medicare Secondary
Payer—Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance) Settlements, Judgments, Awards, or Other Pay-
ments and Future Medicals—Information (Sep. 30, 2011) (available at http://www.cms.gov/COBGen-
eralInformation/Downloads/FutureMedicals.pdf).  Importantly, CMS specified that it would not provide
settling parties with confirmation that Medicare’s interest with respect to future medicals for that settle-
ment has been satisfied, but encouraged beneficiaries and their representatives to maintain the physi-
cian’s certification.
10
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2. Is it reasonably likely that the injured person will have ongoing or future
medical expenses related to the claimed injury?
3. Are these medical expenses otherwise covered by Medicare?
4. Is the beneficiary likely to be a Medicare beneficiary when such medical
expenses are incurred?66
Even in liability cases when a Medicare set-aside appears necessary,
though, the distinct possibility exists that Medicare may never review,
much less approve the set-aside, because unlike workers’ compensation set-
asides, Medicare does not typically review liability set-asides.67  Regard-
less, settling parties should request a review of a liability set-aside, at least
to demonstrate their efforts to comply with MSP.68  It is also prudent to
include general language in a settlement agreement acknowledging Medi-
care’s rights and how its future interest was considered.69
Even absent review or approval, courts may provide a way of demon-
strating that Medicare’s interests were considered when settling with a
Medicare set-aside.70  Courts appear willing to issue declaratory judgments
finding that parties considered and protected Medicare’s future interests
when the parties agree to pay any conditional payments and set aside
money for possible future medical issues that Medicare could potentially
pay.71  However, despite its pecuniary interest, CMS has been reluctant to
join or participate in litigation or settlement proceedings and the judiciary
has acquiesced.72
66. Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 4, § 4.02.
67. Though the CMS regional offices are permitted at their discretion to review cases deemed
worthy.  Jordan, supra n. 19, at 23.
68. Id.
69. Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 7, § 7.03(c).  This language may include a general statement that
Medicare’s future interests were considered when settling followed by an explanation as to how the
consideration was accomplished. Id.
70. See e.g. Schexnayder v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3273547 at *8 (W.D. La. July 29, 2011)
(finding that Medicare’s interests were “adequately protected” after liability MSA approval was sought
from CMS, who responded that approval may not ever be forthcoming); see also Guidry v. Chevron
USA, Inc., 2011 WL 6815626 at *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 28, 2011) (same).
71. See e.g. Frank v. Gateway Ins. Co., 2012 WL 868872 (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2012) (court deter-
mined that Medicare set-aside amount was sufficient when CMS refused to intervene); see also Finke v.
Hunter’s View, 2009 WL 6326944 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2009) (declaratory judgment requiring repayment
of conditional payments, that no MSA was required as the plaintiff was no longer entitled to Medicare
and did not possess a reasonable expectation of entitlement to Medicare within 30 months, and that the
parties had considered and protected Medicare’s future interest); see also Big R Towing, Inc. v. Benoit,
2011 WL 43219 at ** 2–3 (W.D. La. Jan. 5, 2011) (declaratory judgment entered ordering plaintiff, who
would reasonably be Medicare beneficiary in the future, to set-aside money for forecasted medical care,
thereby protecting Medicare’s interests).
72. See e.g. Truett v. Bowman, 288 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911–912 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (dismissing CMS
for want of subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity and determining that agency appeal
process  must be exhausted); see also Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788–790
(W.D. Mich. 2002) (finding sovereign immunity and a lack of statutory support precluded state court
from requiring CMS to attend settlement conference); see also Christopher C. Yearout, Big Brother is
11
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VI. MEDICARE’S RECOVERY OF CONDITIONAL PAYMENTS
When Medicare makes conditional payments, the MSP requires repay-
ment once it is established that another individual or entity is responsible as
a primary payer.  A primary payer’s responsibility is generally demon-
strated by a settlement, judgment, or other payment.73  The MSP allows
CMS to recover conditional payments from any entity that received pay-
ment from a primary payer.74  As soon as CMS learns that a payment has
been, or could be made by a primary payer, it may initiate recovery.75
Of course, it seems rather simple that the next step of the process is to
submit a payment to Medicare for the amount requested in the demand let-
ter.  But in practice, the process can be frustrated by the fact that primary
payers do not want to be exposed to additional liability.76  Such liability
includes the possibility of double payment or a suit from CMS with the
potential for double damage and interest.77  In cases where Medicare has
not yet issued a final demand letter or even a conditional payment letter, the
total amount of conditional payments requiring repayment may be hard to
calculate.78  In these situations, issuing two checks—one to the plaintiff and
one to CMS—is risky as the amount of the Medicare lien is not available.
Therefore, in order to ensure CMS is repaid from settlement proceeds, pri-
mary payers—most often insurers—may add Medicare as a payee on settle-
ment checks.
There is no requirement that Medicare be added as a payee on any
check,79 but doing so may afford the primary payer the best protection.80
However, practitioners should ensure that doing so is a mutually agreed
Not Just Watching, He’s Suing: Medicare’s Secondary Payer Statute Evolves in Aggressive Pursuit of
Fiscal Integrity, 41 Cumb. L. Rev. 117, 151–153 (2011).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“a primary plan, and an entity that receives payment from a
primary plan, shall reimburse the appropriate Trust Fund for any payment made by the Secretary . . . if it
is demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility to make payment with respect to such
item or service.  A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment may be demonstrated by a judgment,
a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a
determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or services included in a claim against the
primary plan or the primary plan’s insured, or by other means.”).
74. Id. at § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
75. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(b); supra, part IV (discussing the MSP claims process).
76. See Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 3, § 3.06(f); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii); 42
C.F.R. § 411.24(c)(2), (h), (m).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii); see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c)(2).
78. CMS implemented a procedure to self-calculate conditional payments amounts in settlements of
$25,000.00 or less when certain requirements are met in order to avoid delay. See MSPRC, New Option
to Self-Calculate Your Conditional Payment Amount, http://www.msprc.info/forms/Fixed%20Percent-
age%20Option%20Information.pdf (accessed July 30, 2012).
79. See e.g. Hearn v. Dollar Rent A Car, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. App. 2012).
80. Roy A. Franco & Jeffrey J. Signor, Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance: How to Mitigate
Exposure in the Medicare Beneficiary Personal Injury Case 48 (Juris Publishing, Inc. 2010).
12
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upon term of a settlement as courts may refuse to enforce settlement agree-
ments in the absence of mutual assent.81  Regardless, in the context of fail-
ure-to-pay claims against insurers, some courts have determined that it is
reasonable for an insurer to list Medicare as a payee even absent a specific
agreement to do so.82
Another way settling parties can avoid future liability under the MSP
is by requiring a general indemnification in settlement agreements.  Unfor-
tunately, the existence of indemnifications between settling parties does not
obviate any responsibilities imposed by the MSP as any agreements are
limited in interaction between the settling parties only.83
CMS recently carved out two exceptions to the traditional recovery
process, most likely to minimize administrative burden.  First, CMS re-
cently announced that it will not recover against a beneficiary’s liability
settlement, judgment, or other payment if a minimum $300.00 threshold is
not met.84  Second, CMS implemented what it calls the “Fixed Percentage
Option,” allowing beneficiaries receiving a settlement of $50,000.00 or less
to pay 25 percent of the gross settlement, irrespective of the amount of
conditional payments made.85
81. See e.g. Tomlinson v. Landers, 2009 WL 1117399 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2009) (motion to enforce
settlement denied as adding Medicare as payee was not mutually agreed upon and because federal law
does not require an insurance company to include Medicare as a payee on a check).
82. See e.g. Porter v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2012 WL 256014 (N.D. Okla. 2012) (reasonable for insurer
to initially list Medicare a co-payee on uninsured motorist benefits check before issues regarding Medi-
care claim resolved); Wilson v. State Farm etc., Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 2d 604, 607 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (no
bad faith when insurer sought to make Medicare a payee on check before paying limits of uninsured
motorist policy); Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WL 665790 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2006) (insurer did
not breach obligation to pay uninsured motorist benefits by listing Medicare as co-payee on check).
83. See Jordan, supra n. 12, at ch. 3, § 3.03(b).
84. MSPRC, $300 Threshold for Some Liability Insurance (including Self-Insurance) Settlements,
http://www.msprc.info/forms/300%20Threshold%20on%20Liability%20Settlements.pdf (accessed Feb.
19, 2012). To be eligible for the $300 threshold exclusion, the settlement, judgment, award or other
payment must be related to an alleged physical trauma-based incident (but does not apply to cases
involving alleged ingestion, implantation, or exposure); the liability insurance (including self-insurance)
settlement, judgment, award, or other payment is less than or equal to $300; the beneficiary has not and
does not expect to receive any other settlements, judgments, awards, or other payments related to the
incident; and Medicare has not previously issued a recovery demand letter.  The $300 threshold does not
apply to cases where an insurer is paying or has paid the beneficiary’s medical bills directly or on an
ongoing basis. Id.
85. MSPRC, Fixed Percentage Option for Medicare’s Recovery Claim, http://www.msprc.info/
forms/Fixed%20Percentage%20Option%20Information.pdf (accessed July 26, 2012).  In order to qual-
ify, the settlement must come from a liability insurance, including self-insurance, but no-fault or work-
ers’ compensation settlements do not qualify. Id. The settlement must be for a physical trauma-based
injury (not related to ingestion, exposure, or medical implant) for a total amount of $5,000 or less. Id.
The Fixed Percentage Option must be elected before a demand letter is issued and the beneficiary must
not receive any other payments related to the incident. Id.  No deduction for procurement costs is
allowed when using the Fixed Percentage Option. Id.
13
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A. Medicare’s Recovery of Conditional Payments from
Discounted Settlements
One of the most highly litigated aspects of the MSP is the amount of
conditional payments that CMS is able to recover from a settlement.  While
the MSP expressly requires that conditional payments made on behalf of a
beneficiary be repaid by a primary plan,86 neither the MSP nor its attending
regulations provide guidance as to the amount of conditional payment re-
covery in situations involving settlements.  Rather, CMS relies on the Medi-
care Secondary Payer Manual (“MSP Manual”), which provides that a re-
duction or waiver of recovery will only be permitted where a court order on
the merits of the case allocates damages among medical and nonmedical
expenses.87  This interpretation allows CMS to fully recover conditional
payments even where a beneficiary’s settlement is less than the benefici-
ary’s total damages.88  Further, when a settlement is silent as to damages for
medical expenses, CMS considers the entire liability payment as being
“made ‘with respect to’ medical services related to the injury.”89
While CMS’s interpretation undoubtedly provides a means for protect-
ing the Medicare Trust Fund, in practice, its application produces curious
results, as the following hypotheticals demonstrate:
First, suppose a case involving $100,000 in conditional payments.  If the
case settles for $50,000, CMS will apply its reimbursement claim of $100,000
against the entire settlement amount and demand the entire $50,000, less pro-
curement costs.  The Medicare beneficiary would receive nothing.
Now, suppose the same case was tried or arbitrated and the plaintiff was
awarded a $50,000 judgment that apportioned $10,000 to medical expense
and $40,000 to pain and suffering.  Pursuant to the MSP Manual, CMS would
direct its reimbursement claim against the $10,000 allocated for medical ex-
pense, less procurement costs.  If procurement costs exceeded $10,000, CMS
would receive nothing.
The litigated outcome in the second scenario provides the Medicare
beneficiary a more favorable result, but not without cost elsewhere.  The
Medicare Trust Fund is repaid only a fraction of conditional payments—if
at all.  Litigation costs are high, and forcing parties to trial severely impedes
the well-settled public policy of promoting settlement.90  Additionally, in-
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“A primary plan . . . shall reimburse [CMS] for any [condi-
tional payment] if it is demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility to make pay-
ment.”).
87. See MSP Manual, supra n. 31, at ch. 7, § 50.4.4.
88. See id.
89. Id. (quotations in original).
90. See Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[CMS’s] position . . . would
have a chilling effect on settlement.  [CMS’s] position compels plaintiffs to force their tort claims to
trial”).
14
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jured Medicare beneficiaries with valid claims may be dissuaded from pur-
suing tortfeasors.91  Of course, the hypothetical is possibly so basic that it
may be blind to reality.  But it is important to note that apportioning arises
in various contexts—often by way of state law concerning issues of wrong-
ful death, survivor claims, “made whole” doctrines, and apportioned liabil-
ity.  Despite the apparent fallacies inhering in CMS’s position, though, it
has withstood the review of most courts.
Most courts agree that CMS’s interpretation of the MSP, which entitles
it to full recovery from settlements, is reasonable and that it comports with
Congress’s legislative intent.92  In Zinman v. Shalala,93 the Ninth Circuit
stated, “[r]eading the MSP legislation to allow full reimbursement of condi-
tional Medicare payments even though a beneficiary receives a discounted
settlement from a third party is a rational construction of the statute . . . .
[and is] consistent with the statute’s purpose.”94 Zinman involved a class
action suit filed by Medicare beneficiaries challenging the full recovery of
conditional payments from discounted third-party settlements.  The class ar-
gued that CMS95 was required to accept a pro rata reduction of a Medicare
conditional payment claim when the beneficiary accepted a settlement for
less than full value.96  In the first of its three arguments, the class argued
that the language of the MSP statute required CMS to reduce its recovery.97
Second, the class argued that, because CMS had a right of subrogation to
effect recovery and because subrogation was equitable in nature, the princi-
ple of equitable apportionment was applicable.98  Third, the class argued
that CMS’s statutory ability to issue a partial payment in some circum-
91. See e.g. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 469–470 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“[T]he full reimbursement approach gives many beneficiaries little incentive to pursue valid claims or,
if they do, to accept otherwise reasonable settlement offers, thereby tending to push them into uncertain
litigation that burdens the courts and may result in little or no recovery for either the [beneficiary] or for
Medicare”); see also Rick Swedloff, Can’t Settle, Can’t Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies From
Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 Akron L. Rev. 557, 600 (2008).
92. See e.g. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845; Baxter Int’l, 345 F.3d at 889 n. 27 (“Courts have uniformly
concluded that a settlement agreement that includes a non-itemized element of compensation for a plain-
tiff’s medical care is ‘for’ medical expenses, even if the exact share or amount is indeterminate”); contra
Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1338 (CMS’s “ipse dixit contained in the field manual does not control the law”).
93. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 841.
94. Id. at 845.
95. At the time of the decision in 1995, the agency now known as the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”) was called the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”).  In 2001,
the Department of Health and Human Services renamed HCFA to CMS.
96. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 843.
97. Id. at 844.  The class argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii), on its face, limited CMS’s
reimbursement right. Id.  The court, however, disagreed. Id. at 846.  In 2003, the MMA amended the
specific language challenged in Zinman, seemingly strengthening an argument that the statute itself does
not contemplate a diminished recovery in settlements. See Hadden v. United States, 661 F.3d 298, 302
(6th Cir. 2011), for a discussion on the amendment’s effect in this context.
98. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 844–845.
15
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stances involving a third party plan indicated that CMS was required to
reduce proportionally its conditional payment claim.99
The Ninth Circuit rejected each of the class’s three arguments, finding
that CMS’s statutory right of reimbursement allowed for complete recov-
ery.  Applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,100 the court held that CMS’s interpretation was a permissible construc-
tion of the MSP and consistent with the statute’s purpose.101  Additionally,
the court buttressed its logic stating, “[a]pportionment of Medicare’s recov-
ery in tort cases would require either a fact-finding process to determine
actual damages or would place Medicare at the mercy of a victim’s or per-
sonal injury attorney’s estimate of damages.”102  CMS often cites this lan-
guage from Zinman in support of the MSP Manual, specifically to disregard
apportioned liability payments.103
Despite a rather long legacy,104 the Eleventh Circuit completely re-
jected Zinman’s deference to CMS’s interpretation of the MSP in Bradley v.
Sebelius.105  In Bradley, CMS sought full recovery of its conditional pay-
ments where a beneficiary’s estate obtained a discounted settlement for a
wrongful death claim.106  Even after a probate court allocated a percentage
of the recovery to medical expenses, CMS relied on the MSP Manual to
argue that the court’s decision was “merely advisory in nature” and that
CMS was, therefore, entitled to recovery from the entire settlement rather
than just the portion allocated to medical expenses.107  CMS appealed the
probate court’s order and a federal district court determined the MSP Man-
99. Id. at 845.
100. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).
When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers, courts use a two-step process:
(1) If “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue[,] . . . the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” . . . and (2) if “the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.  An agency’s interpre-
tation of a statute, as expressed in a regulation, is entitled to deference unless it is “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.
101. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845.
102. Id. at 846.
103. See e.g. Br. of Appellee at 10, Bradley, 621 F.3d 1330, 1338 (“But when, as here, a claimant
enters into a settlement that resolves medical-expense claims along with other claims, the entire settle-
ment payment is available for reimbursement.  In such situations, Congress has sensibly declined to
require ‘a factfinding process to determine actual damages’ or to ‘place Medicare at the mercy of a
victim’s or personal injury attorney’s estimate of damages.’” (citing Zinman, 67 F.3d at 846)).
104. See e.g. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Forkey, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Nev. 2010) (Medicare’s claim
for reimbursement of conditional payments is not limited by equitable apportionment); State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cal., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13564 (Feb. 26, 1997) (state rules of equity do not
trump Medicare’s statutory right of reimbursement).
105. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1332–1333.
106. Id. at 1333.
107. See id. at 1334.
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 73 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-2\MON202.txt unknown Seq: 17 24-OCT-12 9:47
2012 FRUSTRATED SETTLEMENTS 411
ual was entitled to deference, and thus, CMS was entitled to full reimburse-
ment.108
On appeal,109 the Eleventh Circuit held that the MSP Manual was not
entitled to Chevron-deference110 and that CMS’s position in regards to ap-
portionments created an “absurd Catch-22 result.”111  Moreover, the Elev-
enth Circuit chided CMS for its position, stating that it had a “chilling ef-
fect” on settlements and was contrary to the strong public interest in resolu-
tion of lawsuits via settlement.112
The Sixth Circuit recently took a different view in Hadden v. United
States.113  In Hadden, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Brad-
ley, the Sixth Circuit treated apportionment and the MSP very similarly to
the Ninth Circuit in Zinman.  Mr. Hadden received a settlement from one of
two tortfeasors for approximately ten percent of the total damages.114  Ac-
cordingly, he argued that CMS should be limited to only ten percent of its
total conditional payment claim, making two of the same points argued by
the class in Zinman, which the Hadden court rejected.
While Zinman recognized ambiguity in the MSP,115 it nonetheless
found CMS’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)—in that it
was allowed to fully recover conditional payments from a settlement—a
permissible construction of the statute and thus afforded it Chevron-defer-
108. Id. at 1335.
109. In defense of its position taken in the MSP Manual, CMS used Zinman’s reasoning, arguing
that the probate court merely approved the distribution plan provided by the plaintiff’s counsel, in effect
placing Medicare at the mercy of the estate’s attorney to estimate damages.  Br. of Appellee at 10,
Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1338 (citing Zinman, 67 F.3d at 846).
110. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1338 (“[CMS’s] ipse dixit contained in the field manual does not control
the law”).  The court pointed out that “agency interpretations contained in policy statements, manuals,
and enforcement guidelines are not entitled to the force of law.” Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris Co.,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which
lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”)); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (definition in [CMS’s] Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual “is a proto-
typical example of an interpretive rule” that does not require notice and comment, and therefore “do[es]
not have the force and effect of law and [is] not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process”)
(internal citations omitted).
111. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1338–1339 (“Clearly if the language of the field manual applied, in prac-
tice, it would lead to an absurd Catch-22 result.  Forcing counsel to file a lawsuit would incur additional
costs, further diminishing the already paltry sum available for settlement.  This flies in the face of
judicial and public policy.”) (footnote omitted).  The Court also pointed out that CMS’s refusal to par-
ticipate in the probate court’s allocation proceedings and failure to recognize the probate court’s order as
valid because CMS did not participate is a paradox that has been compared “to the oft-told story of the
child defendant found guilty of murdering his parents, only to throw himself upon the mercy of the court
because he is an orphan.” Id. at 1338 n. 19.
112. Id. at 1338.
113. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 304 (6th Cir. 2011), pet. for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3573 (U.S. Mar. 30,
2012) (No. 11-1197).
114. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 300–301.
115. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845.
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ence.116  The court in Hadden interpreted the identical statute, but with ad-
ditional language as amended by the MMA in 2003.117  The Hadden court,
unlike both the Zinman and Bradley courts, found no ambiguity in the stat-
ute, determining that it explicitly allowed CMS to fully recover conditional
payments.118  The court looked specifically to the definition of “responsibil-
ity,” as used in the statute,119 which provides that “a primary plan’s respon-
sibility for [repayment of conditional payments] may be demonstrated by
. . . a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise, waiver or re-
lease . . . of payment for items or services included in a claim against the
primary plan.”120  By the court’s logic, then, Mr. Hadden’s acceptance of
the settlement payment in return for a release of claims made the primary
plan responsible; Mr. Hadden’s claim against the third party (the primary
payer) defined the scope of the primary plan’s responsibility.121  The court
made a key distinction based on its own statutory interpretation—because
Mr. Hadden did not claim just ten percent of the total damages, but rather
claimed all damages—the scope of the primary plan’s responsibility in-
cluded all the conditional payments, thus making Mr. Hadden responsible
for fully reimbursing CMS.122
Dissenting in Hadden, Judge White argued that verbiage in the statute
relied on by the majority was not unambiguous,123 and in fact, as inter-
preted by the majority, created an “absurd result.”124  Moreover, the dissent
argued, the statute was silent as to whether CMS could recover the entire
amount of conditional payments from a beneficiary’s tort recovery without
regard to whether the recovery included full payment for the items or ser-
vices paid for by Medicare.125  Importantly, the dissent contended that
116. Id.
117. At the time Zinman was decided, § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) did not define “responsibility” and read:
“A primary plan, and an entity that receives payment from a primary plan, shall reimburse the appropri-
ate Trust Fund for any payment made by the Secretary under this subchapter with respect to an item or
service if it is demonstrated that such primary plan has or had a responsibility to make payment with
respect to such item or service.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (amended 2003).  In 2003, Congress
enacted the MMA, adding the following language: “A primary plan’s responsibility for such payment
may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise, waiver,
or release (whether or not there is a determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or
services included in a claim against the primary plan or the primary plan’s insured, or by other means.”
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
118. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 302.  By contrast, the court in Bradley found the identical language to be
ambiguous and therefore underwent an analysis to determine if CMS’s interpretation of the statute was
entitled to deference. Bradley, 621 F.3d at 1337–1338.
119. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 302.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
121. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 302.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 306 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Chevron is “not the answer to the [MSP]’s silence” since the issue involves
an interpretation in the MSP Manual rather than the statute or attending
regulations.126  Instead, because it is not the product of formal, notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the MSP Manual is ‘“entitled to respect,’ but only to
the extent [it has] the ‘power to persuade.’”127
Because of the circuit split, the United States Supreme Court could
grant certiorari to review Hadden, perhaps resolving the ongoing dilemma
regarding CMS’s recovery from apportionments.  If (or when) certiorari is
accepted, the Court could possibly resolve the issue much as it did in Ar-
kansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,128 where it
limited the government’s right to reimbursement of Medicaid payments to
the amount allocated to medical expenses in a settlement.  The Hadden
court distinguished Ahlborn, finding that the Medicaid statute contained
language limiting the state’s obligation to recover from settlement proceeds
paid to a Medicaid beneficiary whereas the MSP did not.129  The dissent,
however, pointed out that CMS’s suspicion that recognition of non-judicial
allocations would allow settlement manipulation, leaving CMS with little to
recover was “considered and unanimously rejected” by the Supreme Court
in Ahlborn.130  By granting certiorari in Hadden and finding similar to Ahl-
born, the Supreme Court could settle the dilemma about recovery from dis-
counted settlements.
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Change may come from the legislative branch as well.  In March 2011,
Congressmen Tim Murphy (R–PA) and Ron Kind (D–WI) introduced
House Bill 1063, entitled “The Strengthening Medicare and Repaying Tax-
payers” (SMART) Act,131 which seeks to improve the efficiency of the
MSP recovery system.  As discussed above, the obligation to repay Medi-
care arises only when a settlement, judgment, or insurance payment oc-
126. Id.
127. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 307 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
128. Ark. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 284–285 (2006) (applying
the Medicaid statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396k(a)(1)(A), 1396a(a)(25)(A), to strike down an Arkansas stat-
ute that automatically imposed a lien in favor of the State upon settlement payments to Medicaid benefi-
ciaries, which limited the state’s obligation to seek reimbursement from settlement proceeds paid to a
Medicaid beneficiary).
129. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 303–304 (majority).  Arguably, the majority dismissed Mr. Hadden’s ar-
gument that Ahlborn was apposite by merely characterizing the cases as interpreting “a different term in
a different statute.” See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 23, Hadden v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___ (No. 11-1197).
130. Hadden, 661 F.3d at 308 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288) (“[T]he
risk that parties to a tort suit will allocate away the State’s interest can be avoided either by obtaining the
State’s advance agreement to an allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for
decision.”).
131. H.R. 1063, 112th Cong. (Mar. 14, 2011).
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curs.132  Medicare, therefore, cannot assert a demand for reimbursement un-
til settlement has occurred.  Enactment of the SMART Act would appar-
ently rectify current issues that impede timely settlements.133
The SMART Act would amend the MSP in five significant ways.
First, the amendment would allow settling parties to notify CMS up to 120
days prior to a settlement, judgment, award, or other payment, at which
point CMS would have 65 days to respond by providing a statement of
reimbursement.134  If CMS failed to respond, it would waive its right to
recovery.135  This would allow parties to receive a final determination of
the amount of conditional payments made, thus expediting settlement.  Sec-
ond, the SMART Act would require CMS to establish a minimum threshold
that would exempt small claims from reporting requirements.136  Third, the
SMART Act would modify the currently mandatory MSP penalties, making
them discretionary.137  Fourth, the amendment would require CMS to mod-
ify the reporting process so that primary payers do not have to access or
report Social Security numbers or health identification numbers.138
Finally, the SMART Act provides that the statute of limitations for
MSP recovery actions would be three years from receipt of the Section 111
report.139  Currently, the statute of limitations applied by federal courts is
six years pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a).140  The SMART Act, if enacted,
could have a profound effect on settlements implicating the MSP as it
would resolve several of the major confusions of the MSP.
VIII. CONCLUSION
From the toothless 1980 statute, the MSP has evolved to a point where
parties must be exceptionally cautious when settling in order to avoid the
MSP’s current “teeth.”  Although the MSP’s evolution has strengthened the
government’s ability to recoup conditional payments, difficulties remain
due to a lack of clear statutory guidance.  This difficulty is seen in most
areas involving the MSP, but especially in cases involving discounted set-
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
133. Ingram, supra n. 2, at 1, 4.
134. H.R. 1063, 112th Cong. at § 2.
135. Id.  The proposed legislation, though, does provide a requirement that the parties who requested
the statement of reimbursement notify CMS of the failure to respond.  In turn, CMS would have an
additional 30 days to provide the statement of reimbursement.  Otherwise CMS would effectively waive
its right to reimbursement absent “exceptional circumstances.”
136. Id. at § 3.
137. Id. at § 4.
138. Id. at § 5.
139. Id. at § 6.
140. See e.g. Manning v. Utilities Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 254 F.3d 387, 397–398 (2d Cir. 2001); Provi-
dent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp 492, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
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tlements and future medical expenses that require a Medicare set-aside.
While proposed regulations may resolve some issues concerning Medicare
set asides and future expenses, the United States Supreme Court is poten-
tially poised to resolve the amount of recovery that the government can
seek from discounted settlements.  While these issues await resolution,
practitioners would be well served to approach MSP cases proactively by
addressing conditional payments amounts and Medicare eligibility during
preliminary settlement discussions.  Further, diligent efforts to protect
Medicare’s interests—both past and future—will protect clients and attor-
neys from the MSP’s onerous penalties.
21
Kuchel: Frustrated Settlements: Common Problems and Solutions in Liability Settlements Invoking the Medicare Secondary Payer Statutes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\73-2\MON202.txt unknown Seq: 22 24-OCT-12 9:47
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 73 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/6
